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Right-Sizing the Supreme Court:
A History of Congressional
Changes
Michael C. Blumm,† Kate Flanagan,††
and Annamarie White†††
Abstract
Since the Republican Senate refused to consider President Obama’s
nomination of Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court in 2016—coupled
with the Trump Administration’s success in filling that seat with Neil
Gorsuch, followed by the appointments of Brett Kavanaugh and Amy
Coney Barrett—there has been widespread interest in how to balance
a suddenly solidly conservative Court majority, one likely to remain so
for decades. One way to do so is to expand the size of the Court, an
issue the Constitution left to Congress, which exercised that authority
repeatedly during the Constitution’s first eighty years. This article
examines those mostly forgotten congressional changes to the Court’s
size as well as Congress’s more notorious failure during the New Deal.
The article reveals that the successful expansions were often due to
population growth, but were always the product of political
calculations. Since the U.S. population is now nearly ten times larger
than it was when Congress last changed the Court’s size, reconsidering
the Court’s size may be an issue ripe for congressional consideration,
should the political winds suggest that is possible.
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Introduction
The Republican Senate’s successful maneuvering in 2016 to deny
President Obama an opportunity to fill Justice Antonin Scalia’s seat,1
followed by the rushed confirmation of Justice Amy Coney Barrett to
replace Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg in 2020,2 prompted widespread
calls for reforming the Court, from calling for a code of ethics to
increasing public access to the Court’s proceedings.3 Among the more
prominent suggested reforms are the imposition of term limits4 and

1.

See generally Ron Elving, What Happened with Merrick Garland in 2016
and Why It Matters Now, NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrickgarland-in-2016-and-why-it-matters-now [https://perma.cc/6SVL-PVZT].

2.

See generally Lisa Mascaro, Barrett Confirmed as Supreme Court Justice
in Partisan Vote, Associated Press (Oct. 26, 2020), https://apnews.com/
article/election-2020-donald-trump-virus-outbreak-ruth-baderginsburg-amyconey-barrett-82a02a618343c98b80ca2b6bf9eafe07 [https://perma.cc/PCR7MTSP].

3.

The nonpartisan organization “Fix the Court” lobbies for various “fixes”
to federal courts, especially the Supreme Court. The Fixes, Fix the Ct.,
https://fixthecourt.com/the-fixes [https://perma.cc/7SRH-7YWB] (last
visited Sep. 7, 2021) (proposing “fixes” such as expanding media and
public access to Court proceedings, implementing a code of ethics for
Supreme Court justices, and requiring detailed and easily accessible
financial disclosure reports, among others).

4.

Fix the Court endorses term limits for Supreme Court justices. Term Limits,
Fix the Ct., https://fixthecourt.com/fix/term-limits/ [https://perma.cc/
D7AQ-BQ9L] (Sep. 29, 2020). The idea of term limits for federal judges
is hardly new, as a broad array of leaders from across the political
spectrum have discussed the proposal since the ratification era. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Mazza, A New Look at an Old Debate: Life Tenure and the
Article III Judge, 39 Gonz. L. Rev. 131, 135–55 (2004) (overviewing the
debate over life tenure from 1787 through the late-20th century, and
endorsing a system of “rotating offices” for federal judges). A term limit
of eighteen years was proposed as a constitutional amendment in 1986.
See Philip D. Oliver, Systematic Justice: A Proposed Constitutional
Amendment to Establish Fixed, Staggered Terms for Members of the
United States Supreme Court, 47 Ohio St. L.J. 799, 800–01 (1986)
(suggesting staggered, nonrenewable, eighteen-year terms for Supreme
Court justices).

10

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3784511

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Right-Sizing the Supreme Court

changing the size of the Court to respond to its increasingly partisan
makeup.5 In response to recent interest in Court reforms, in April, 2021
In 2020, several members of the House of Representatives (Ro Khanna
(D-Cal.), Don Beyer (D-Va.), and Joe Kennedy III (D-Mass.)) introduced
a bill that would limit every president to two Supreme Court nominations
during a four-year term. The bill would also confine the justices’ terms to
eighteen years on the Supreme Court, then designate them as “Senior
Justices,” allowing the retirees the opportunity to sit on lower federal
courts and rejoin the Court temporarily should there be an unexpected
vacancy. See Supreme Court Term Limits and Regular Appointments Act
of 2020, H.R. 8424, 116th Cong. Within a month, over thirty legal scholars
endorsed the bill. Letter from D. Benjamin Barros, Dean and Professor of
L. at Univ. of Toledo Coll. of L., et al. (Oct. 23, 2020) (on file with the
Campaign for Supreme Court Term Limits), https://fixthecourt.com/
wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Endorsers-of-H.R.-8424-10.23.20f.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4QRL-RU3F]. Current Supreme Court Justices Stephen
Breyer and Elena Kagan, along with Chief Justice John Roberts, have
also indicated support for term limits. See Amanda Dworkin, Breyer
Reaffirms His Support for Term Limits for Justices, Fix the Ct. (Oct.
22, 2020), https://fixthecourt.com/2020/10/breyer-reaffirms-supportjudicial-term-limits-justices/ [https://perma.cc/R6LM-HCUB]; Term
Limits: The Justices’ Own Answer to the Broken SCOTUS Confirmation
Process, Fix the Ct. (July 7, 2019), https://fixthecourt.com/2019/07/
termlimits/ [https://perma.cc/KRG6-9V7K].
Although fixed term limits may, at first glance, appear to conflict with
the constitutional provision allowing justices tenure “during good
behavior,” almost all legal scholars agree that a term-limit plan like that
proposed in the 2020 Supreme Court Term Limits and Regular
Appointments Act would not require a constitutional amendment because
it would not remove Supreme Court justices after eighteen years, it would
merely rotate them to other positions in the federal judiciary. See, e.g.,
Tyler Cooper, Insight: Fixed Terms for Supreme Court Justices Checks
Constitutionality Boxes, Bloomberg Law (June 3, 2019, 4:01 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/insight-fixed-terms-forsupreme-court-justices-checks-constitutionality-boxes [https://perma.cc/
87YT-NPZ8]; Kermit Roosevelt III & Ruth-Helen Vassilas,
Coming to Terms with Term Limits: Fixing the Downward Spiral
of Supreme Court Appointments 11–12 (2017), https://www.acslaw.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Coming_to_Terms.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZS6P-24KN] (exploring the problems inherent in Supreme Court appointments in a hyper-partisan process, such as older, out-of-touch justices staying
on the bench and the related problem of strategic judicial retirement; and
proposing eighteen-year term limits instituted by statute as a solution).
5.

See, e.g., Astead W. Herndon & Maggie Astor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s
Death Revives Talk of Court Packing, N.Y. Times (Oct. 22, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/19/us/politics/what-is-courtpacking.html [https://perma.cc/T3QP-E5FM] (discussing the basic idea
of “court packing” and Democratic lawmakers’ shifting support in favor
of the plan); Matt Ford, The Deradicalization of Supreme Court Reform,
New Republic (Oct. 29, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/
159993/chris-coons-court-packing-barrett [https://perma.cc/L3MR-KW2V]
(surveying the debate surrounding court packing in the wake of the
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the Biden Administration created a bipartisan commission made up of
prominent attorneys, former judges, and legal scholars6 to evaluate
confirmation of Justice Amy Coney Barrett, and arguing that focus should
be on the hyper-partisan nature of the Court, rather than on its size).
In addition to calls for establishing term limits and adding seats to the
Court, other suggestions include a “Supreme Court Lottery,” which would
select nine-member Supreme Court panels randomly from all 179 federal
appeals-court judges and the current justices, limiting panels to no more
than five nominated by a president of a particular political party, and
requiring a six-member majority to strike down federal statutes. See
Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129
Yale L.J. 148, 181, 193 (2019) (proposing a fifteen-justice “Balanced
Bench” approach and the Supreme Court lottery system as alternative
structures to the current Court). Another proposal would require a sevenmember majority to declare statutes unconstitutional. See, e.g., Ian
Millhiser, 9 Ways to Reform the Supreme Court Besides Court-Packing,
Vox (Oct. 21, 2020, 12:55 PM), https://www.vox.com/21514454/
supreme-court-amy-coney-barrett-packing-voting-rights [https://perma.cc/
KEZ5-UXJE] (discussing the arguments for and against a supermajority
voting requirement, among other ideas for altering the Court or weakening
its power). Still others argue that the legislature should take steps to
“disempower” the Court by limiting its power to review certain types of
federal laws. Ryan D. Doerfler & Samuel Moyn, Making the Supreme
Court Safe for Democracy, New Republic (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://newrepublic.com/article/159710/supreme-court-reform-courtpacking-diminish-power [https://perma.cc/8DBD-36FZ] (arguing that socalled “court packing” is not a long-term solution to the Court’s political
disposition because if the Democrats add seats to the Court now, the next
Republican majority will surely do the same; also maintaining that since
the Court has been unable practice judicial restraint on its own, Congress
should “disempower” the Court through jurisdiction-stripping or supermajority requirements).
6.

For a complete list of the Commissioners, see President Biden to Sign
Executive Order Creating the Presidential Commission on the Supreme
Court of the United States, The White House: Briefing Room (Apr.
9, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/
2021/04/09/president-biden-to-sign-executive-order-creating-the-presidentialcommission-on-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/
QCW6-CGFN]. In response to the Commission, the President of
progressive legal organization the American Constitution Society sent a
letter to the Commissioners urging them to “provide a meaningful
contribution to restoring the legitimacy of [the] judiciary.” See ACS
President Urges Court Reform Commission to Act with Urgency,
Prioritize Specific Recommendations, Am. Const. Soc’y (May 19, 2021),
https://www.acslaw.org/press_release/acs-president-urges-court-reformcommission-to-act-with-urgency-prioritize-specific-recommendations/
?utm_medium=email&utm_source=20210521_bulletin [https://perma.cc/
STB2-PKEW]. However, while the Commission includes legal scholars
from both sides of the political aisle, not everyone is satisfied with the
program. Some progressives criticized the Commission as merely a means
by which President Biden can nullify increasing pressure to expand the
Court. See Ian Millhiser, Biden’s Supreme Court Reform Commission
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issues facing the federal judiciary.7 In the executive order establishing
the program, President Biden requested that the Commission issue a

Won’t Fix Anything, Vox (Apr. 10, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/
2021/4/10/22375792/supreme-court-biden-commission-reform-courtpacking-federalist-society [https://perma.cc/BG8S-5656]. Conservatives,
on the other hand, argued that the program is, in fact, a vehicle to add
additional left-wing justices to the bench. See Rep. Jim Jordan
(@Jim_Jordan), Twitter (Apr. 9, 2021, 10:49 AM), https://twitter.com/
Jim_Jordan/status/1380578616040390660 [https://perma.cc/WZB9-JV53]
(tweeting, in response to the creation of the Commission, “Why study
something we already know? Democrats want to pack the Supreme Court.”).
7.

Exec. Order No. 14,023, 86 Fed. Reg. 19,569, 19,569 (Apr. 14, 2021); see
Biden Starts Staffing a Commission on Supreme Court Reform,
POLITICO (Jan. 27, 2021, 2:52 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/
2021/01/27/biden-supreme-court-reform-463126 [https://perma.cc/97H8CBNU]; Joseph Choi, Biden Begins Staffing Commission to Study
Supreme Court Reform: Report, Hill (Jan. 27, 2021, 3:21 PM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/536155-biden-administrationbegins-staffing-commission-on-court-reform?rl=1 [https://perma.cc/5LVYBY5A]. The thirty-six-member commission is to examine the structure of
the federal court system and generate recommendations to improve a
system that, in the president’s words, is “getting out of whack.” 60
Minutes, Joe Biden: The 60 Minutes 2020 Election Interview, YouTube
(Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kSAo_1mJg0g. For
a transcript of the 60 Minutes interview, see Norah O’Donnell, Joe Biden
Makes the Case for Why He Should Be President, CBS News: 60
Minutes (Oct 25, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/joe-bidendemocratic-presidential-candidate-kamala-harris-60-mintues-interviewnorah-odonnell-2020-10-25/ [https://perma.cc/8GFK-UZ9E].
Proposed changes include adding additional seats to the Court and
creating a constitutional court (common in other countries like Germany
and France) to resolve constitutional questions and free up the Court to
other cases in its increasingly crowded docket. See Joan Biskupic, Biden’s
Supreme Court Commission Set to Launch as Some Liberals are Eager to
Pack the Court, CNN (Jan. 30, 2021, 12:03 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/
01/30/politics/supreme-court-biden-commission/index.html [https://
perma.cc/3EBS-3GST]; Biden Has Created a Commission to Study the
Judiciary, electoral-vote.com (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.electoralvote.com/evp2021/Pres/Maps/Jan28.html#item-6
[https://perma.cc/
2AG4-79FB]; Michael Klarman, The Democrats’ Last Chance to Save
Democracy, Atlantic (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/
archive/2021/02/expanding-court-now-or-never/618063/ [https://perma.cc/
7LMB-SMYP] (urging Democratic lawmakers to quickly add four
additional seats to the Supreme Court in order to course-correct the
Republican Party’s “undermining of democracy” in recent years); Kent
Greenfield, Opinion: How to Fix the Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (Oct.
27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/10/27/opinion/
supreme-court-reform.html#greenfield (proposing that Congress create a
“constitutional court” designed to hear constitutional issues and bar such
questions from being heard by the Supreme Court unless a supermajority
of justices voted to hear the case).
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report by the end of 2021.8 The report was to analyze historical and
contemporary debates surrounding the Supreme Court’s role in the
federal system, including how its members are nominated and
appointed, but curiously was not expected to produce specific
recommendations. The report will address several of the proposed
modifications for the size and structure of the Court, focusing on the
merits and legality of the recommended reforms.9 Whether the
8.

Exec. Order No. 14023, 86 Fed. Reg. at 19569 (requiring a report to be
delivered to the president within 180 days); Charlie Savage, Biden’s Supreme
Court Commission May Weigh a Range of Potential Changes Beyond
Expanding Seats, N.Y. Times (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/04/16/us/bidens-supreme-court-commission-may-weigh-a-range-ofpotential-changes-beyond-expanding-seats.html [https://perma.cc/YDR2GWJE] (suggesting that the Commission’s first public meeting would be
held in May 2021). The report was originally expected in October 2021.
See Tyler Pager, Biden Unveils Commission to Study Possible
Expansion of Supreme Court, Wash. Post (Apr. 9, 2021, 5:37 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-to-unveil-commission-tostudy-possible-expansion-of-supreme-court/2021/04/09/f644552c-994411eb-962b-78c1d8228819_story.html [https://perma.cc/2HMD-ZVJ5]. But
the commission delayed the report until December 2021. Arlette Saenz,
Biden Supreme Court Commission Delays Final Report to December 15,
CNN: Politics (Nov. 3, 2021, 8:06 AM), https://www.cnn.com/
2021/11/03/politics/supreme-court-commission-delayed/index.html
[https://perma.cc/G4GJ-9LX8].

9.

See Pager, supra note 8. The co-chairs of the Commission broke the group
down into five working groups, each made up of approximately seven
members. See Charlie Savage, Supreme Court Commission to Scrutinize
Changes Beyond Expanding Justice Seats, N.Y. Times (Apr. 15, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/15/us/politics/supreme-courtcommission.html [https://perma.cc/STV5-G6QF]. Each working group
will focus on a different aspect of the Supreme Court debate, working
privately to gather information on their respective areas of focus, before
presenting their findings to the rest of the Commission at publicly held
hearings.
One working group focused on the problems that have consistently
plagued the Supreme Court, including historical calls for Supreme Court
reform. A second group examined the Court’s constitutional role in the
federal system and Congress’ ability to alter the breadth of the Court’s
jurisdiction. The third group gathered materials on the length of the
justices’ terms and collect proposals to limit their tenure via term limits
or mandatory retirement ages. A fourth group collected information about
the membership and size of the Court, looking in part at how to reduce
partisan tensions on the bench. A fifth group looked at concerns regarding
the Court’s overflowing docket. Id. A related issue, which may be
considered by the Commission, is the Court’s so-called “shadow docket,”
including the numerous orders handed down by the Court or its justices
each year that generally lack any sort of transparency, such as how each
justice voted or the reasoning behind the decision. Id; see also The
Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell.
Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 117th Cong.
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Commission will yield lasting change is quite unclear. However, the idea
is not new. There is a long history of interest among the political
branches to change the Court’s composition and its procedures.10
In April 2021, a bill that would add four members to the Supreme
Court was presented by House Judiciary Committee Chair Jerry Nadler
(D-N.Y.) along with co-sponsors, Representatives Hank Johnson (DGa.) and Mondaire Jones (D-N.Y.).11 Senator Ed Markey (D-Mass.)
simultaneously introduced the “Judiciary Act of 2021” in the Senate.12
The House Judiciary Committee’s press release emphasized Nadler’s
remarks that the bill would conform the number of justices to the
number of circuits, as Congress had done from the creation of the Court
until the time of the Civil War.13 Neither Senate Judiciary Chair Dick
Durbin nor House Speaker Nancy Pelosi expressed immediate support
for the bill, telling reporters that they would wait for the recommendations of the presidential commission.14 With Democrats’ thin majority

(2021) (testimony of Stephen I. Vladeck, Charles Alan Wright Chair
in Federal Courts, University of Texas School of Law),
https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/VladeckShadow-Docket-Testimony-02-18-2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/PTL7-DLGK]
(exploring the history of the “shadow docket,” including its increasing use
in recent years, the various problems it presents, and suggesting
congressional reform to both curtail and standardize its use).
10.

For example, in the 1970s, scholars debated the wisdom of establishing a
National Court of Appeals to respond to the mounting number of cases
seeking Supreme Court review. The new court would have consisted of
seven rotating appellate-court judges tasked with reviewing all appeals,
including resolving circuit splits, referring only the most “review-worthy”
cases to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Paul A. Freund, Why We Need the
National Court of Appeals, 59 A.B.A. J. 247, 247, 250 (1973) (arguing
that the unprecedented caseload of the Supreme Court warranted change
and the National Court of Appeals would be the least disruptive solution);
cf. Charles L. Black, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: An Unwise
Proposal, 83 Yale L.J. 883, 883, 885, 887 (1974) (challenging the
proposal on both constitutional and public-policy grounds).

11.

Expand the Supreme Court: Reps. Nadler, Johnson, and Jones and
Senator Markey Introduce Legislation to Restore Justice and Democracy to
Judicial System, U.S. House Comm. on the Judiciary: Press Releases
(Apr. 15, 2021), https://judiciary.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?
DocumentID=4508 [https://perma.cc/E5P3-JHE6].

12.

Judiciary Act of 2021, S. 1141, 117th Cong. (2021).

13.

Chairman Nadler Remarks at Press Conference Announcing Introduction
of Judiciary Act of 2021, U.S. House Comm. on the Judiciary: Press
Releases (Apr. 15, 2021), https://judiciary.house.gov/news/document
single.aspx?DocumentID=4510 [https://perma.cc/H3E3-6VSY].

14.

Andrew Chung & David Morgan, Cool Reception for Democratic Proposal
to Expand U.S. Supreme Court, Reuters (Apr. 15, 2021, 9:50 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/democrats-unveil-bill-expand-ussupreme-court-by-four-justices-2021-04-15/ [https://perma.cc/6MHL-T2PP].
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in the Senate, any reluctance from leadership to move the bill forward
would likely kill the bill’s chances of being enacted.
Given these recent developments, it seems propitious to survey the
history of successful congressional efforts to change the size of the
Court, which began in the Founding Era and continued throughout
antebellum America. The Court’s size ranged from six members to ten
before settling on nine in 1869.15 The size of the Court was a function
of the political dynamics of the day, as Congress enlarged the Court to
enable favored presidents to appoint new members and constricted the
Court to deny appointments to those Congress disfavored.16 The
politicization of the size of the Court continued largely unimpeded until
President Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal ran into the well-known
conflict with a Republican Supreme Court, as discussed in Part V of
this article. Parts I–IV explain the expansions and contraction during
the 19th century. The article concludes that, despite the apparent
lessons drawn from the so-called “court packing” efforts of FDR,
political control of the size of the Court is unassailable. There may be
reasons to retain the current nine-member Court, but they are clearly
not of a constitutional or historical nature.

I. The Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789
A. The Constitution

Article III of the Constitution provided only a rough outline of the
federal judiciary. Significantly shorter than Articles I and II, Article III
established “one supreme Court” and any “inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”17 Although the
Framers decided early in the constitutional debates in Philadelphia to
establish a Supreme Court,18 they did not establish the size of the Court.
Instead, the constitutional debates discussed how the federal judiciary
would interact with the other two branches of government,19 the

15.

Why Does the Supreme Court Have Nine Justices? Nat’l Const. Ctr.:
Const. Daily (July 6, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/whydoes-the-supreme-court-have-nine-justices [https://perma.cc/Z5DE-DLEP].

16.

Id.

17.

U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.

18.

Fed. Jud. Hist. Off., Fed. Jud. Ctr., Constitutional Origins of
the Federal Judiciary 1–2 (2005), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/ConstitutionalOrigins.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9EF-7J6K].

19.

See, e.g., James Madison’s remarks in 2 The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, at 74 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (discussing the
proposition of providing the judiciary with revisionary power over laws
passed by the legislature, Madison argued that such a power would be
“useful to the Judiciary departmt. [sic] by giving it an additional
opportunity of defending itself agst: [sic] Legislative encroachments.”).
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justices’ tenure and compensation,20 and the judiciary’s jurisdictional
bounds.21 The most contentious debate concerning the judiciary was
whether to establish lower federal courts.22
Federalists pressed for the creation of lower federal courts to serve
as the principal trial courts for legal disputes under federal purview.23
In letters from Philadelphia, delegates acknowledged pressure to create
a system of government that balanced the power of individual states
with that of the new nation.24 After the Constitution was sent to the
states for ratification, Anti-Federalists, alarmed at the possibility that
federal courts might usurp the responsibilities of state courts,
vehemently opposed the establishment of lower federal courts.25
Supporters like Alexander Hamilton maintained that, compared with
the legislative and executive branches, a federal judiciary would “be the
least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution.”26 The
drafters decided not to resolve the issue of the size of the Court, leaving
the matter to Congress.27

20.

Journal, Acts and Proceedings of the Convention, Assembled
at Philadelphia, Monday, May 14, and Dissolved Monday,
September 17, 1787 which Formed the Constitution of the
United States 69 (Thomas B. Wait 1819) [hereinafter Journal, Acts
and Proceedings of the Convention, Assembled].

21.

Id. at 188–89.

22.

See Richard W. Garnett & David A. Strauss, Article III, Section One,
Nat’l Const. Ctr.: Interactive Const., https://constitutioncenter.org/
interactive-constitution/interpretation/article-iii/clauses/45 [https://
perma.cc/7ECK-CEAX] (last visited Sep. 5, 2021).

23.

Fed. Jud. Hist. Off., supra note 18, at 2, 5–7.

24.

See, e.g., Letter from Pierce Butler to Weeden Butler (Oct. 8, 1787), in
24 Letters of Delegates to Congress, November 6, 1786–
February 29, 1788, at 470–72 (Paul H. Smith & Ronald M. Gephart
eds., 1996) (“We had Clashing Interests to reconcile—some strong
prejudices to encounter, for the same spirit that brought settlers to a
certain Quarter of this Country, is still alive in it.”).

25.

See, e.g., Letters of “Brutus”, in 1 The Debate on the
Constitution 168 (Bailyn ed., 1993), reprinted in Fed. Jud. Hist. Off.,
supra note 18, at 18; Nathaniel Breading et. al, The Address and
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention, of the
State of Pennsylvania, to Their Constituents 1 (Dec. 12, 1787),
https://www.loc.gov/resource/bdsdcc.c0401 [https://perma.cc/WH7AMLW6].

26.

The Federalist No. 78, at 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).

27.

See Journal, Acts and Proceedings, of the Convention,
Assembled, supra note 20, at 363 (authorizing Congress to create lower
courts whose judges would hold their offices during good behavior and
receive a salary “which shall not be diminished during their continuance
in office”).
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B. The Judiciary Act of 1789

The nation’s new federal government officially began on March 4,
1789.28 The judiciary was immediately at the top of the first Congress’s
agenda. The first bill introduced in the Senate would become the
Judiciary Act of 1789.29
The First Congress debated whether to establish lower federal
courts and the size of the Supreme Court, deciding on the unlikely
number of six justices.30 Six was the choice because the bill divided the
country into thirteen district courts and three geographical circuits.31
Each district bench would have one federal judge who would primarily
hear admiralty and maritime cases, as well as other minor suits.32 Unlike
appellate circuit courts of the modern judiciary (which were established
in the Judiciary Act of 1891), the original circuit courts exercised only
limited appellate jurisdiction over the district courts.33 Their primary
function was instead to serve as the principal federal trial courts of the

28.

See The Day the Constitution Was Ratified, Nat’l Const. Ctr. (June
21, 2021), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-day-the-constitutionwas-ratified [https://perma.cc/3R4T-ZNSM].

29.

See The Court as an Institution, Sup. Ct. of the U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/institution.aspx [https://perma.cc/
N4BB-9HCS] (last visited Sep. 5, 2021). Chaired by Connecticut senator
Oliver Ellsworth, a committee began to draft the bill on April 7, 1789,
the day after the Senate achieved its first quorum. Senator Ellsworth’s
Judiciary Act, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
minute/Senator_Ellsworths_Judiciary_Act.htm [https://perma.cc/6ZM6UZKS] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). With debates over ratification still
fresh in the national conscience, the Senate distributed the proposed
legislation to constituents and invited comments prior to debating the bill.
Landmark Legislation: Judiciary Act of 1789, Fed. Jud. Ctr., https://www.
fjc.gov/history/legislation/landmark-legislation-judiciary-act-1789-0/
[https://perma.cc/455U-KGZQ] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). Within the
committee, Ellsworth represented the Federalist viewpoint and Richard
Henry Lee of Virginia voiced the Anti-Federalist perspective. See Wythe
Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 Duke L.J. 1421, 1480–81. The two
men worked together to create a bill acceptable both to Federalists and
Anti-Federalists. See id. at 1481–85. Section 11 of the bill, establishing
the lower federal courts, fixed the number of justices to be appointed to
the Supreme Court at six. See Charles Warren, New Light on the History
of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49, 76 (1923).

30.

See Holt, supra note 29, at 1485–86.

31.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 1–2, 4, 1 Stat. 73, 73–75.

32.

Landmark Legislation: Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 29.

33.

Russell R. Wheeler & Cynthia Harrison, Fed. Jud. Ctr., Creating the
Federal Judicial System, 4, 24 (1989), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/
Digitization/120728NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/TN7D-TW7U]. See infra
note 82 for details on the Judiciary Act of 1891.
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day.34 Each circuit court consisted of a panel of one local district judge
and two travelling Supreme Court justices.35 Consequently, part of the
job description for the Chief Justice and the five associate justices was
to “ride circuit.”36 Two justices assigned to each of the three circuits
made a six-justice Court a reasonable choice, especially since it saved
money by making separate circuit-court judges unnecessary.37 The
34.

Id. at 4, 7–9.

35.

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74–75.

36.

See Dale Yurs, The Early Supreme Court and the Challenges of Riding
Circuit, 36 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 181, 183 (2011).

37.

Although deciding to establish lower federal courts, Ellsworth sought to
appeal to Anti-Federalists by imposing jurisdictional limits on federal
courts. Questions of federal law would be tried in state courts only.
Appeals could go only to the Supreme Court, not an intermediary federal
court, and only when the decision by the highest state court ruled against
the federal law in question. The bill also limited the Supreme Court’s
appellate jurisdiction to review only errors of law, not issues of fact. See
Holt, supra note 29, at 1485–86 (discussing the compromises in the bill).
Opponents of the Ellsworth bill included its co-author, Richard Henry
Lee, who worked with William Grayson, also of Virginia, to put forth
“The Virginia Plan,” which would have replaced the proposed district
courts with existing state trial courts. Id. at 1490–91. After that plan
failed, William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut proposed to replace the
district and circuit courts with a large, undetermined number of traveling
Supreme Court justices, an idea swiftly defeated in the Senate. See id. at
1493.
The most vocal opponent of Ellsworth’s plan was William Maclay of
Pennsylvania. Although Maclay entered the legislature as a Federalist, he
quickly developed strong Anti-Federalist positions. See Journal of William
Maclay, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_
item/Maclay.htm [https://perma.cc/6S3P-TEWZ] (last visited Sep. 4,
2021, 3:23 PM). Of the Judiciary Bill, Maclay wrote in his diary: “I do
not like it in any part.” Entry of May 11, 1789, in Journal of William
Maclay, United States Senator from Pennsylvania, 1789–1791,
at 30 (Edgar S. Maclay ed., 1891) [hereinafter Journal of William
Maclay]. The Senate debated the proposed bill for seventeen days. See
Hampton L. Carson, The Supreme Court of the United States:
Its History 128–29 (1891). When the debate turned to the number of
Supreme Court justices, opinions varied considerably. William Grayson,
the Virginia Plan having been defeated, supported the suggested six. Id.
at 130. Maclay, on the other hand, believed that six was too few if the
circuit courts were established, and too many if they were not. At one
point, Ellsworth took the floor and argued for a court of twelve. In support
of a larger bench, Ellsworth emphasized the importance of the cases that
would be before the Supreme Court, mentioning the twelve judges of the
Court of Exchequer. Maclay responded by pointing out the considerable
difference in the number of cases being heard by the English court, and
those which would reach the Supreme Court. He suggested that perhaps
once the amount of cases being heard by the Supreme Court increased, it
would be appropriate to expand the Court in response. Maclay also
emphasized the idea that more justices on the Court would diminish the
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unstated assumption was that the Supreme Court’s size was more a
function of its role in overseeing lower federal courts than of the danger
of deadlocks over doctrine.38
Appointing the district judges and Supreme Court justices was a
task for the newly inaugurated President George Washington, with the
consent of the Senate.39 Washington quickly nominated John Jay for
Chief Justice on September 24, 1789, the day he signed the Act.40 The
Senate confirmed Jay just two days later.41 Thus, two years after the
Framers signed the Constitution, and fifteen months after ratification,
Article III’s sketch of the federal judiciary began to be fulfilled.

responsibility of each individual justice, maintaining that it was more
important to place “eminent characters” on the bench than to have a
large Court. For Maclay’s full version of events, see Entry of June 23,
1789, in Journal of William Maclay, supra, at 87–88. The Senate
settled on a Supreme Court consisting of one Chief Justice and five
Associate justices. See Carson, supra, at 131.
Once the judiciary bill passed the Senate, deliberations surrounding the
legislation simmered. The House did entertain a brief discussion about the
number of Supreme Court justices, however. On the first day of
deliberations, Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire moved to reduce the
number of Associate Justices to three. Interestingly, James Jackson, an
Anti-Federalist, challenged this idea by pointing out that an issue would
inevitably arise when the court was split 2–2. No one pointed out that the
same fate might befall a court of six. Instead, Egbert Benson, a Federalist,
urged the House to pass the bill without much deliberation, as the Senate
had debated the issue at length, and the congressional term was drawing
to a close. See 1 Annals of Cong. 782 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
The House debated the bill on three more occasions without revisiting the
number of justices before passing it with a handful of amendments, which
the Senate concurred in and supplemented. The House passed the final
version of the Judiciary Act of 1789 on September 21, 1789. Id.
38.

See Yurs, supra note 36, at 183.

39.

Washington had the benefit of a Senate with 18 pro-administration
members and just 8 anti-administration members. See Party Division: 1st
Congress, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.
htm#:~:text=1st%20Congress%20(1789%2D1791)&text=Those%20who
%20supported%20the%20Washington,emerging%20(Jeffersonian)%20Re
publican%20party [https://perma.cc/2PU6-GKU3] (last visited Sep. 5,
2021). The House had 37 pro-Administration members and 28 antiadministration members. See Congress Profiles: 1st Congress, U.S.
House of Representatives, https://history.house.gov/CongressionalOverview/Profiles/1st/ [https://perma.cc/YH7Z-VD9C] (last visited Sep.
5, 2021).

40.

Supreme Court Nominations (1789-Present), U.S. Senate, https://www.
senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.
htm [https://perma.cc/FW9P-DHGG] (last visited Sep. 5, 2021).

41.

Id.

20

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3784511

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Right-Sizing the Supreme Court

II. The Judiciary Acts of 1801 and 1802
A. The Judiciary Act of 1801

Circuit riding was arduous. Both physically and mentally taxing,
the obligation quickly became unpopular among the justices. Justices
complained that it required traversing as many as 1,900 miles (on bad
roads and inconsistent ferries) within a single circuit.42 A number
declined judicial nominations or resigned from the bench rather than
continue the odious duty.43 Those who remained on the Court wrote
President Washington on at least two occasions, in 1790 and 1792,
expressing their intense dislike of the practice.44 All six justices also
penned their disapproval to Congress in 1792, imploring the legislature
to drop the circuit-riding requirements established by the 1789 Act.45
These efforts proved to be only somewhat successful: in 1793, Congress
responded by reducing the number of justices required to visit each
circuit from two to one, cutting the justices’ circuit riding in half.46
The reduction in circuit-riding quieted the discussion surrounding
circuit courts for a time.47 Towards the end of 1799, however, the
impending election of 1800 thrust the courts back into the spotlight.
President John Adams and his Federalist supporters, worried over the
apparent increasing political strength of the nascent Republican Party,
undertook a vigorous campaign to expand the federal judiciary to
maintain their control.48 Federalist majorities in both houses of
Congress began crafting what would become the Judiciary Act of 1801,49
described as “An Act to provide for the more convenient organization
of the Courts of the United States.”50

42.

John V. Orth, How Many Judges Does It Take to Make a Supreme Court?,
19 Const. Comment. 681, 683 (2002).

43.

Yurs, supra note 36, at 183.

44.

Id. at 186.

45.

Id. at 186–87.

46.

Orth, supra note 42, at 683.

47.

Yurs, supra note 36, at 187.

48.

See Kathryn Turner, Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801, 22
Wm. & Mary Q. 3, 9 (1965).

49.

See id. at 9–10. Notably, the committee in the House included future
Chief Justice John Marshall. Id. at 10. Marshall was a member of the
House of Representatives from March 4, 1799 to June 7, 1800, including
time served on the committee to revise the judiciary system. Id.; John
Marshall, U.S. House of Representatives: Hist., Art & Archives,
https://history.house.gov/People/Listing/M/MARSHALL,-John-(M000157)/
[https://perma.cc/S9CD-HXED] (last visited Oct. 23, 2021). In June of
1800, Marshall resigned from the House to become Secretary of State. Id.

50.

Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89, 89.
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The House first considered the new judiciary bill on March 11,
1800.51 In its original form, the bill decreased the number of Supreme
Court justices from six to five and abolished the district courts.52 It
would have re-divided the nation into twenty-nine districts, forming
nine circuits, each with its own circuit judge.53 Since each of these new
judgeships would need to be filled, the bill provided an opportunity for
the Adams administration to appoint Federalist judges across the
country, thereby cementing the Federalists’ hold on the judiciary in
what turned out to be the waning days of the Adams Administration.
Debate over the bill raged in the House for weeks. Ultimately, the bill’s
key provision, establishing the twenty-nine districts, was narrowly
defeated on March 27, 1800.54 The Republican opponents of the bill
successfully postponed the issue until after the election of 1800.55 In
that landmark election, Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans
narrowly defeated Adams and the Federalists.56
The Republican electoral victory led the outgoing Federalists to use
the lame-duck session of Congress to attempt to cement their control
over the federal judiciary, having lost both the presidency and
Congress.57 In mid-December 1800, Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth
resigned to give President Adams an opportunity to appoint his
successor, and Adams swiftly nominated John Jay, the original Chief
Justice, to replace him.58 Jay declined, however, so Adams appointed
his Secretary of State, John Marshall, who was quickly approved by the
outgoing Federalist majority in the Senate.59 On January 20, 1801, the
51.

See Turner, supra note 48, at 11.

52.

See id.

53.

Id.

54.

10 Annals of Cong. 646 (1800).

55.

See Turner, supra note 48, at 14.

56.

10 Annals of Cong. 1024 (1801). Jefferson (and Burr) won the electoral
vote over Adams (and Pinckney), 73–65, although the popular vote was
not so close. With just 32.3% of eligible voters voting, the Republican
ticket won 41,330 (61.4%) to 25,952 (38.6%) for the Federalist ticket.
Electoral vs. Popular Votes, Norwich Univ. Online (Dec. 1, 2015),
https://online.norwich.edu/academic-programs/resources/electoral-vspopular-votes [https://perma.cc/U8FN-YDRN].

57.

Turner, supra note 48, at 15. After the election, Republicans controlled both
houses of Congress and the presidency. The Republican majority in the Senate
was 17–15, while in the House the Republican majority was 68–38. See Party
Division: 7th Congress, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/history/
partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/ZZZ2-B48U]; Congress Profiles: 7th Congress
(1801-1803), U.S. House of Representatives: Hist., Art &
Archives, https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/7th/
[https://perma.cc/X2DH-8AM9].

58.

See Turner, supra note 48, at 14–15.

59.

S. Exec. Journal, 6th Cong., 2d. Sess. 374 (1801).
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same day that President Adams nominated Marshall as Chief Justice,
the House approved the judiciary bill.60
The bill then moved to the Senate, where the lame-duck Federalist
majority tried to push it through without amendment, while the
Republicans sought to delay its passage until Adams’ term expired.61
At one point, the Senate considered and rejected a motion that would
have increased the size of the Supreme Court to eight.62 With just a
month left in the Federalist administration, the Senate approved the
House bill, and President Adams signed the Judiciary Act of 1801 into
law on February 13, 1801.63 The Act established six circuits, each with
three resident circuit judges (except the sixth circuit, which had only
one), which—much to the justices’ relief—eliminated the need for
circuit riding.64 This provision entitled Adams to sixteen judicial
appointments (the so-called “midnight judges”), which he moved
quickly to fill before his term expired.65
A related statute, passed a couple of weeks later, added three
additional circuit judgeships and more than forty justices of the peace.66
That Act also would have also decreased the Supreme Court from six
justices to five, the first instance of Congress altering the size of the
Supreme Court.67 The diminished size was clearly a partisan measure,
aimed at depriving incoming President Jefferson of filling the next
vacancy on the Court. This attempt to downsize the Court motivated
the incoming Republican Congress to overturn the 1801 Act once the
lame-duck session ended.68
B. The Judiciary Act of 1802

In March 1802, with the Republicans in control of both houses of
Congress and the presidency, Congress reversed the Federalists’

60.

See Id. at 371 (1801); H. Journal, 6th Cong., 2d. Sess. 767 (1801). The
Senate approved Marshall as Chief Justice only seven days later. S. Exec.
Journal, 6th Cong., 2d. Sess. 374 (1801).

61.

See Turner, supra note 48, at 19–20; see also S. Journal, 6th Cong., 2d.
Sess. 121–23 (1801) (showing that the Senate majority consistently
rejected any amendments to the bill).

62.

10 Annals of Cong. 740–41 (1801).

63.

See Kathryn Turner, The Midnight Judges, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 484, 495
(1961).

64.

See id. at 494–95.

65.

See id.

66.

See id. at 517–19; Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 3, 2 Stat. 103, 105–06
(“An Act concerning the District of Columbia.”); id. § 11, 2 Stat. at 107.

67.

See Erwin C. Surrency, The Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 Am. J. Legal Hist.
53, 62 (1958).

68.

See id. at 63–64.
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expansion of the judiciary.69 One of the first acts of the new Congress,
passed on March 8, 1802, repealed the 1801 Act.70 The 1802 statute
rescinded the new circuit courts, restored the old circuits, reinstituted
circuit riding, and returned the size of the Supreme Court to six
justices.71
This Act was the second time Congress changed the Court’s size
for partisan reasons. The repeal of the lower court additions led one
disappointed justice-of-the-peace appointee, William Marbury, to
initiate what became the most consequential case in Supreme Court
history.72 The Act also abolished the 1802 term of the Court, so
Marbury’s suit would not be heard that year.73
Having repealed the 1801 Act in March, the Republican Congress
aimed to pass a judiciary act of its own. One month later, Congress
passed, and President Jefferson signed, the Judiciary Act of 1802—

69.

See Jed Glickstein, Note, After Midnight: The Circuit Judges and the
Repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, 24 Yale J.L. & Human. 543, 550
(2012).

70.

Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132 (“An Act to repeal certain
acts respecting the organization of the Courts of the United States; and
for other purposes.”).

71.

Id. §§ 1–5, 2 Stat. at 132.

72.

See Glickstein, supra note 69, at 544. Along with the circuit courts, the
midnight judges and ancillary appointments were rescinded or, for those
who had yet to receive them, denied their commissions. Id. One of the
justices of the peace denied his commission was William Marbury, who
sued Secretary of State James Madison in an attempt to force the
Jefferson administration to honor his appointment. Id.

73.

Id. at 550. The justices would not meet again in Washington until the
following February, when they would finally take up the issue of whether
the repeal act was, in fact, constitutional. Id. Chief Justice Marshall, a
Federalist who had helped draft the 1801 Act, handed down the landmark
decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), on
February 24, 1803. Marshall wrote for a unanimous 4–0 Court against
Marbury (Justice William Cushing missed the entire February term due
to illness, and Justice Alfred Moore had not yet arrived from North
Carolina; so neither sat for oral argument or participated in the Court’s
decision). See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180; see also Robert
Strauss, John Marshall: The Final Founder, 126 (2021). Marshall
decided that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to restore Marbury’s
judgeship, declaring a provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act that expanded
Article III’s grant of original jurisdiction of the Court to be an
unconstitutional expansion of judicial authority, establishing judicial
review of the constitutionality of legislation. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177–80.
Later, in 1803, the Court upheld the authority of Congress in the 1802
Act to abolish the midnight judgeships in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 299, 308–09 (1803), from which Marshall recused himself. See
Glickstein, supra note 69, at 555–56.
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which again divided the country into six judicial circuits.74 The 1802
circuits were similar, though not identical, to the six circuits established
in 1801.75 Consequently, the Act did not change the size of the Supreme
Court. Having already restored the number of justices to six with the
first 1802 Act, Congress provided President Jefferson the opportunity
to appoint a justice at the next vacancy, which he seized by nominating
William Johnson in May of 1804.76

III. The 1807 and 1837 Judiciary Acts
A. Adding a Seventh Circuit

Following the tumult of 1801 and 1802, the judiciary was in relative
political peace for half a decade. Kentucky, which achieved statehood
in 1792,77 and Ohio had been included in the short-lived sixth circuit
created by the Judiciary Act of 1801.78 But neither was included in a
circuit in the 1802 Act.79 Instead, when organizing the judicial districts
for Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee, Congress exempted the new
western states from the traditional circuit structure.80 Separated from
the rest of the circuits by the Appalachian Mountains, Congress
considered the new western states too distant for circuit-riding Supreme
Court justices to reach.81 Consequently, the federal district courts in
these three states retained the trial jurisdiction usually reserved for the
federal circuit courts, and all appeals went directly to the Supreme
Court.82

74.

Judiciary Act of 1802, ch. 31, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157 (“An Act to amend
the Judicial System of the United States.”).

75.

Compare id., with Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 6, 2 Stat. 89, 90.

76.

Justices 1789 to Present, Sup. Ct. of the U.S., https://www.
supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/4JPM5MHX] (last visited Sept. 1, 2021).

77.

Comm. on the Judiciary, One Hundred and Seventy-Fifth
Anniversary of the Admission of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky to the Union, S. Rep. No. 90-247, at 2 (1967).

78.

Judiciary Act of 1801 § 4, 2 Stat. at 89–90.

79.

See Judiciary Act of 1802, § 4, 2 Stat. at 157 (excluding Kentucky and
Ohio from the list of districts included in the six circuits).

80.

See id.; Landmark Legislation: Seventh Circuit, Fed. Jud. Ctr.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/legislation/landmark-legislation-seventh-circuit
[https://perma.cc/E6AA-ZPB4] (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).

81.

Landmark Legislation: Seventh Circuit, supra note 80.

82.

Id. Because Congress thought that circuit riding was too difficult for
justices in these three western states, the justices were exempted from the
circuit system when the 1802 Act redrew circuit lines. Instead, local
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Meanwhile, the United States’ westward expansion was rapidly
underway, enthusiastically encouraged by Jefferson.83 Within the first
half of the new decade, population growth made it apparent that the
existing judicial structure was inadequate. The nation’s rapid western
settlement induced a raft of federal lawsuits in the western states,
including complicated diversity cases resulting from disputes over
federal land claims.84 As a result, in early 1807, the Senate advanced a
bill to establish circuit courts in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio.85 The
bill proposed a seventh circuit and an expansion of the Supreme Court’s
size from six justices to seven members.86 The resulting 1807 Act
integrated the new circuit for the western districts into the judicial
system. But it also included a residency requirement, requiring the
newly authorized Supreme Court justice to reside within the new
Seventh Circuit.87 Presumably included to address the realities of circuit
riding in the western district, the requirement was the only residency
provision in the judiciary acts.88

district courts in these states assumed the trial function usually reserved
for the circuit courts. Id.
The appellate courts as we know them today (as the U.S. Courts of
Appeals) were not established until Congress enacted the Judiciary Act
of 1891, which stripped the old circuit courts of most of their appellate
jurisdiction, transferring appellate power to the new circuit courts of
appeals, but left them in place as trial courts. Act of March 3, 1891, ch.
517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 827 (“An act to establish circuit courts of appeals
and to define and regulate in certain cases the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United Sates, and for other purposes.”); see Appellate Jurisdiction
Transferred to New Courts, Fed. Jud. Ctr., https://www.fjc.gov/
history/timeline/appellate-jurisdiction-transferred-new-courts [https://
perma.cc/D5VH-WX8L] (last visited Sep. 26, 2021).
The old circuit courts were officially terminated in the Judicial Code of
1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1087, leaving the district courts as
federal trial courts and the courts of appeals as the middle tier of the
judiciary. Id. §§ 1, 117, 36 Stat. at 1087, 1131; see Circuit Riding, Fed. Jud.
Ctr., https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/circuit-riding [https://perma.cc/
E27H-84RB] (last visited Sep. 26, 2021).
83.

Thomas Jefferson, Libr. of Cong., https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/
jeffwest.html [https://perma.cc/6D72-WDXH] (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).

84.

Landmark Legislation: Seventh Circuit, supra note 80.

85.

Seventh Circuit Act of 1807, ch. 16, § 2, 2 Stat. 420, 420 (“An Act
establishing Circuit Courts, and abridging the jurisdiction of the district
courts in the districts of Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio.”); 16 Annals of
Cong. 46 (1807) (showing the Senate’s passage of the corresponding bill).

86.

Seventh Circuit Act of 1807 §§ 2, 5, 2 Stat. at 420, 421.

87.

Id.

88.

Landmark Legislation: Seventh Circuit, supra note 80.
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Congress enacted the 1807 Act with little fanfare, making its way
from the Senate to the House, where it passed 82–7.89 The addition of
a seventh justice by the Republican Congress—the third change to the
size of the Court in six years—gave the Republican Jefferson the
opportunity to appoint Thomas Todd to the Court.90 With the federal
government under complete Republican control, the Seventh Circuit
Act of 1807’s expansion of the Court, giving the Republican president
a new appointment, was considerably less controversial than the
fractious 1801 and 1802 statutes.
B. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits

For thirty years following the creation of the Seventh Circuit, the
judicial system remained largely unchanged. In 1820, Maine achieved
statehood and was incorporated into the First Circuit.91 All other states
entering the Union, however, were established—as Kentucky and Ohio
had been—with a federal district court exercising the trial jurisdiction
usually reserved for circuit courts.92 These courts were quickly overrun
with cases.93 Congress considered proposals to extend circuit riding or
add more circuit courts (and, consequently, to add seats to the Supreme
Court) almost every session of Congress after 1815.94 In 1825, 1826, and
1830, Congress debated the need for additional circuits at length, but
no bill ever won the support of both houses.95 When he was in the White
House (1825–1829), President John Quincy Adams was largely at

89.

Id.; 16 Annals of Cong. 500 (1807) (recording that the bill was passed
without amendment in the House).

90.

See Thomas Todd, Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/justices/thomas_todd
[https://perma.cc/QGC2-VWE5] (last visited Sep. 2, 2021). Todd drafted
Kentucky’s Constitution and served as Chief Justice of the state supreme
court when appointed to the Supreme Court. Confirmed in 1807, he served
nearly twenty years on the Court, writing only a handful of opinions
focused almost exclusively on land claim disputes. Id.

91.

See Statehood Achieved, Me. State Museum, https://mainestatemuseum.org
/exhibit/regional-struggle/statehood-achieved/ [https://perma.cc/B56ESS65] (last visited Sept. 15, 2021); Act of Mar. 30, 1820, ch. 27, § 1, 3
Stat. 554, 554 (“An Act establishing a circuit court within and for the
district of Maine.”).

92.

See Landmark Legislation: Eighth and Ninth Circuits, Fed. Jud. Ctr.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/legislation/landmark-legislation-eighth-andninth-circuits [https://perma.cc/Q8XF-AFYG] (last visited Sep. 25, 2021).

93.

Id.

94.

Fed. Jud. Hist. Off., Fed. Jud. Ctr., 1 Debates on the Federal
Judiciary: A Documentary History 203 (Bruce A. Ragsdale ed.,
2013).

95.

Id. at 203–04.
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political odds with Congress,96 so any legislation that might have given
Adams new judicial appointments predictably foundered.97
After his election in 1828, Andrew Jackson, a westerner from
Tennessee, reminded Congress that a quarter of the nation had no
access to a circuit court.98 This lack of “a reasonable opportunity
afforded for a due administration of the laws” was a common cry among
the states admitted after 1807.99 Complicated land disputes continued
to plague the frontier, with land titles variously granted by other states,
foreign governments, and Indigenous tribes.100 These questions and
other disputes arising out of settlement were most appropriately
resolved by a federal court, because they often involved litigation
between foreign nationals and U.S. citizens or between indebted citizens
of the western states and their eastern creditors.101 As the number of
potential litigants skyrocketed, with the population tripling between
1807 and 1830, so did the docket of the courts in the Seventh Circuit,
the circuit closest to the frontier.102 Justice Todd, riding circuit in the
distant Seventh Circuit, had to travel some 2,600 miles a year, widely
assumed to be the reason for a breakdown in his health.103
96.

See John Quincy Adams, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
about-the-white-house/presidents/john-quincy-adams/ [https://perma.cc/
XH8C-X3TK] (last visited Sept. 15, 2021) (recounting some of Adams’
conflicts with Congress); Margaret A. Hogan, John Quincy Adams:
Domestic Affairs, Univ. of Va.: Miller Ctr., https://millercenter.org/
president/jqadams/domestic-affairs [https://perma.cc/BG76-Q7VN] (last
visited Nov. 4, 2021) (same).

97.

See Orth, supra note 42, at 684 n.14.

98.

See Landmark Legislation: Eighth and Ninth Circuits, supra note 92.

99.

See Curtis Nettels, The Mississippi Valley and the Federal Judiciary,
1807-1837, 12 Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. 202, 202 (1925) (quoting
Tennessee Senator Hugh White’s speech before the Senate, found in 2
Reg. Deb. 524 (1826)). Among the seven states admitted between the
1807 Act and Jackson’s election were the trans-Appalachian states of
Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri (others were the southern states of
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana as well as Maine, carved out of
Massachusetts). Id. at 203; see supra text accompanying note 91.

100. See Nettels, supra note 99, at 203–05.
101. See id. at 203–04.
102. See id. at 205. The Seventh Circuit’s population increased from 742,000
in 1807 to 2.31 million in 1830. See id.
103. Id. at 205. Litigants also called for judicial reform. In addition to the
congestion of the local courts, the absence of access to a circuit court
posed particular challenges for criminal justice. Criminal defendants, for
example, frequently found their fate solely in the hands of a single district
judge. Unlike in the circuit-court system, Supreme Court justices did not
preside over these trials. Under the circuit system, a criminal defendant
could appeal a case of first impression to the Supreme Court itself.
Defendants in states outside of this system had no such option for review;
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Congress debated expanding the number of federal courts and the
number of Supreme Court justices on a number of occasions during this
era.104 Finally, in the 1830s, with Jacksonian Democrats in control of
the presidency and both houses of Congress,105 re-sizing the Supreme
Court became politically possible for the fourth time. Although by 1836,
Jackson had appointed five of the seven members of the Supreme
Court106—including Roger Taney as Chief Justice107—two additional
justices would cement Jacksonian dominance of the Court and could
have, perhaps, even overturned Marshall-era precedents.108 After Martin
Van Buren was elected to succeed Jackson in 1837, Congress expanded
the judiciary, creating the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, reorganizing the
Seventh Circuit, and expanding the Supreme Court’s size to nine
members.109 President Jackson signed the Act into law on March 3,
1837, the last day of his presidency.110 That same day, Jackson
nominated John Catron of Tennessee and William Smith of Alabama
to the Court.111 The newly seated Senate confirmed both nominations,

final judgment lay with the district judge alone. See id. at 206–07.
Similarly, for cases involving disputes for less than $2,000, parties within
the circuit system had the option to appeal the opinion of a district court
to the local circuit court. Litigants in the West did not have this
opportunity, even though disputes worth $2,000 or less constituted most
of the disputes in the western states. Finally, even for cases that could, in
theory, reach the Supreme Court (such as those involving disputes over
$2,000), the expense and difficulty inherent in travelling to Washington
posed a significant barrier for many parties. See id.
104. See id. at 224–25.
105. See F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the
Supreme Court, 41 Ariz. St. L.J. 645, 666 (2009).
106. Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 76.
107. Id.
108. See Hessick & Jordan, supra note 105, at 666; see also Reorganization of
the Federal Judiciary: Hearing on S. 1392 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 75th Cong. 342 (1937) (statement of Charles Grove Haines,
University of California at Los Angeles) (“President Jackson found it
necessary to change the trend of constitutional interpretation. Decisions
of the [Supreme] Court on Indian affairs were not enforced. Roger B.
Taney was appointed Chief Justice with the intention of changing the
course of judicial decisions.”).
109. Landmark Legislation: Eighth and Ninth Circuits, supra note 92; Eighth
and Ninth Circuits Act of 1837, ch. 34, § 1, 5 Stat. 176, 176–77 (“An Act
supplementary to the act entitled ‘An act to amend the judicial system of
the United States.’”).
110. See Orth, supra note 42, at 684 n.14.
111. See Carl B. Swisher, 5 History of the Supreme Court of the
United States: The Taney Period, 1836-64, at 62–63 (1974).
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but Smith subsequently declined to serve, giving Van Buren a Supreme
Court appointment to begin his presidency.112

IV. The Civil War and Reconstruction Eras
When President Abraham Lincoln took office in 1861, there were
nine judicial circuits: five in Southern slave states and four in Northern
free states.113 Because Supreme Court justices traditionally resided in
the circuits they were assigned to oversee, the majority of justices were
from slave states. The Southerner-dominated Court had angered
Northerners with a series of pro-slavery decisions. The infamous Dred
Scott decision of 1857 was especially odious, holding that Black people,
enslaved or free, were not citizens of the United States entitled to
constitutional rights,114 and that enslaved people continued to be
enslaved even when transported to free states.115 Chief Justice Taney’s
opinion also declared that the Missouri Compromise, which forbade
slavery in certain western territories, was an unconstitutional overreach
of Congress.116
After Southern states seceded to join the Confederacy, most
Southern Congressmen resigned, giving Republicans a solid congressional majority.117 Consequently, Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of
1862, which reorganized the circuits so that Northern states comprised

112. See id. at 63, 65–66. President Van Buren appointed John McKinley to
the new seat in September of 1837. See also Supreme Court Nominations
(1789-Present), supra note 40.
113. Maps of Judicial Circuits, Judgeships, and Meeting Places, Fed. Jud. Ctr.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/federal-judicialcircuits [https://perma.cc/6SL3-RFGD] (last visited Sep. 25, 2021).
114. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403–04 (1857), superseded
by constitutional amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
115. Id. at 452.
116. Id. at 399, 452 (interpreting the Constitution’s grant of power to Congress
to make laws relating to the territory of the United States, found in U.S.
Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, to not apply to territories acquired after 1787).
Taney’s interpretation was the only time the Property Clause was
interpreted narrowly, as the Supreme Court has consistently ruled since
then that the clause is “without limitation.” See Peter A. Appel, The
Power of Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property Clause and
Federal Regulation of Private Property, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 42–43 (2001);
Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Property Clause and Its
Discontents, 43 Ecology L.Q. 781, 799 n.116 (2016).
117. See LaJuana Davis, The Legal Implications of the Voting Rights Act
Consent Decree on Jefferson County’s Government, 40 Cumb. L. Rev.
815, 820–21 (2009); Gabriel J. Chin, The “Voting Rights Act of 1867”:
The Constitutionality of Federal Regulation of Suffrage During
Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1581, 1589 (2004).
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six circuits, leaving only three made up of Southern states.118 This
reorganization enabled Lincoln to fill the newly vacant seats in the
circuits with Northerners. Soon after the reorganization, the Supreme
Court had six Democratic appointees and three Lincoln-appointed
Republicans.119
In 1863, with the nation seized in the anguish of war, Congress
added the Tenth Circuit, bringing the total number of circuits in the
free states to seven.120 The 1863 Act added a circuit to serve the new
states on the Pacific Coast: California and Oregon.121 The purpose was
primarily logistical; the Western states were so isolated and distant that
a separate circuit seemed necessary for the efficient administration of
justice.122 But the bill was amended to include the addition of a tenth
Supreme Court justice.123 The Republican Congress thereby succeeded
in balancing the Court’s membership between Unionists and Taneyaligned holdovers.124
With the Confederate states out of the Union, neither the new
circuit nor the tenth justice generated controversy. For example, the
New York Times story on the additions was buried in a list of end-ofCongress accomplishments that briefly explained that the law’s
additions “will speedily remove the control of the Supreme Court from
the Taney school.”125

118. Judiciary Act of 1862, ch. 178, § 1, 12 Stat. 576, 576 (amending the Act
of Mar. 3, 1837, ch. 34, 5 Stat. 176).
119. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 76. The Democratic appointees
on the court when Lincoln took office were James M. Wayne, John
Catron, Samuel Nelson, Robert C. Grier, Nathan Clifford, and Chief
Justice Roger B. Taney. See id. (listing justices, their dates in office, and
the president that appointed them). In 1862, Lincoln appointed Noah H.
Swayne, Samuel F. Miller, and David Davis to replace two justices that
died and a Southerner who resigned. Id. Swisher, supra note 111, at 815.
120. Tenth Circuit Act of 1863, ch. C, § 1, 12 Stat. 794, 794 (“An Act to
provide Circuit Courts for the Districts of California and Oregon, and for
other Purposes”).
121. Id.
122. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1259 (1866) (recording the
concern that the circuit justice would need to travel so far that the original
circuit was impractical).
123. Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1300–01 (1863).
124. See Swisher, supra note 111, at 811, 830.
125. According to the New York Times, “The bill providing for a ninth
Supreme Court Judge has passed the House, and awaits the President’s
signature. This Judge will be assigned to the Circuits on the Pacific Coast.
He, of course, adds one to the number which will speedily remove the
control of the Supreme Court from the Taney school.” Important from
Washington: The Revenue Bill and Other Important Measures, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 4, 1863, at 1.
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As the election of 1864 approached, the North, with the fall of
Atlanta that July, had victory in its sights.126 For the 1864 election,
Republicans rebranded themselves as the National Union Party, and its
convention nominated Abraham Lincoln for president and Democrat
Andrew Johnson for vice-president.127 With the Confederate South
unable to cast electoral votes, the bipartisan Lincoln–Johnson ticket
won easily.128 Soon after the election, Lincoln replaced the recently
deceased Chief Justice Taney with Salmon P. Chase, a favorite
candidate of the so-called “radical Republicans.”129
Lincoln served less than two months of his second term. When
Andrew Johnson took office after Lincoln’s assassination in April
1865,130 the Court was “tied,” with five Lincoln appointees and the five
remaining members of the Taney court.131 Less than two months later,
Democratic appointee Justice John Catron died.132
Johnson waited almost a year before appointing Catron’s
replacement.133 In the meantime, he demonstrated hostility to the
objectives of the radical Republicans’ Reconstruction agenda by vetoing
the 1865 Civil Rights Bill,134 as well as a bill that would have extended

126. With the impending end of the war, Radical Republicans began to lobby
Lincoln to severely punish the South and provide substantial assistance
to former slaves. See Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie
Years and the War Years 465–77 (1954); Charles Fairman, 4
History of the Supreme Court of the United: Reconstruction
and Reunion, 1864-88, pt. 1, at 1 (1971).
127. Sandburg, supra note 126, at 515, 517–18.
128. See id. at 182–83, 611–12.
129. See Fairman, supra note 126, at 2; Michael Les Benedict, Salmon P.
Chase as Jurist and Politician: Comment on G. Edward White,
Restructuring Chase’s Jurisprudence, 21 N. KY. L. Rev. 133, 140, 142
(1993); see also Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of
American Freedom, 1860-1870, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 2153, 2179 (1995).
130. See Sandburg, supra note 126, at 735.
131. See id. at 616; Fairman, supra note 126, at 1; Supreme Court
Nominations (1789-Present), supra note 40 (listing justices and their dates
in office); The Taney Court, Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/
The_Taney_Court [https://perma.cc/4HAW-ZSF9] (last visited Sep. 16,
2021) (showing the justices that served with Taney in an easy-to-read list).
132. See Fairman, supra note 126, at 3.
133. See id. at 161–62.
134. See id. at 162.
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the authority of the Freedman’s Bureau.135 The heavily Republican
Congress overrode both vetoes.136
In April 1866, President Johnson appointed Henry Stanbery to
Catron’s seat.137 Stanbery was known to share Johnson’s hostile views
toward Reconstruction.138 The Senate never held hearings on the
nomination, though.139 Two months before Stanbery’s appointment, the
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, James F. Wilson (RIowa), had introduced a bill to reduce the Court’s size to nine, saying
that he would support even further reductions.140 The unmistakable
intent was to deprive Johnson of a Supreme Court appointment.
Chief Justice Salmon Chase proposed an even more restrictive
restructuring, calling for a reduction in the size of the Court to seven
while proposing a near-doubling of the justices’ salaries.141 Chase drafted
the amendment anticipating a second bill that would end circuit-

135. See id. Established by Congress in 1865, the Freedmen’s Bureau “was
responsible for the supervision and management of all matters relating to
the refugees and freedmen and lands abandoned or seized during the Civil
War . . . .” The Freedmen’s Bureau, National Archives, https://www.archives.
gov/research/african-americans/freedmens-bureau [https://perma.cc/V8W4WYZX].
136. See Fairman, supra note 126, at 162.
137. See id. Shortly before being nominated, Stanbery had served “[a]s counsel
associated with the Attorney General” and was “the principal draftsman
of [President Johnson’s] veto message” when Johnson vetoed the Civil
Rights Bill of 1866. Id.
138. See id.
139. See id. After the Senate sat on Stanbery’s judicial nomination, Johnson
nominated him to be Attorney General.
140. Rep. James Wilson, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
introduced the bill to the House, saying:
We have now an opportunity to reduce [the size of the court]
to the old number of nine, and I am satisfied that the business of
the court and of the country will be promoted and benefited by a
still further reduction. There is now a vacancy on the supreme
bench. The purpose of this bill is to avail ourselves of that event
so as to reduce the number of judges and again constitute the
court of an odd number, and parcel the vacant circuit out among
the remaining circuits. That is the sole object of this bill.
I should be in favor myself, from information I have from
some of the members of the court, of still further reducing the
number if another vacancy now existed; and I think that in the
judiciary amendment act it might be well to provide for a further
reduction if vacancies should occur.
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1259 (1866).
141. See Fairman, supra note 126, at 167.

33

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3784511

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 72·Issue 1·2021
Right-Sizing the Supreme Court

riding.142 However, Congress accepted only the part of Chase’s
amendment that reduced the size of the Court, approving it by a mostly
party-line vote.143 Congress lacked the constitutional authority to
remove members of the Supreme Court, so the Act reduced the size of
the court by preventing the president from filling vacancies until there
were only six associate members.144 The change did not seem
consequential to the New York Times, which buried its reporting of the
diminished Court on page four, with no commentary.145
The Act effectively prevented President Johnson from appointing
anyone to the Supreme Court and delinked the number of Justices from
the number of circuits.146 So, in 1867 when Justice James Wayne died,
leaving the Court with eight members, Johnson could not appoint a
replacement.147 If circuit-riding duties had been removed from the
Supreme Court, the remaining eight justices might have been adequate
for the tasks required of them. But it was soon apparent that the
diminishing Supreme Court was accumulating a growing backlog of
cases.148 Thus, two years later, Congress approved a bill to return the
Supreme Court to its pre-war size of nine.149 The bill fell victim to a
pocket veto by President Johnson.150
In 1869, after the hero of the Union’s victory, Republican Ulysses
S. Grant, took office, Congress entertained several possible fixes to the
Supreme Court.151 One proposal would have expanded the court to
eighteen, enabling half the justices to ride circuit while the other half
heard cases in Washington.152 In the end, Congress merely restored the
142. S. 103, 39th Cong. (1866) (“To reorganize the judiciary of the United
States.”).
143. See Fairman, supra note 126, at 168–69; Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3rd
Sess. 1484 (1869).
144. Judicial Circuits Act of 1866, ch. 210, § 1, 14 Stat. 209, 209 (“An Act to
fix the Number of Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, and
to change certain Judicial Circuits.”).
145. See Washington News: The Bill Reorganizing the Supreme Court Signed,
N.Y. Times, July 23, 1866, at 4.
146. See David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev.
383, 432, 476 (2008); see Judicial Circuits Act of 1866 §§ 1–2, 14 Stat. at
209 (setting the number of justices at seven but keeping nine circuit
courts).
147. See William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: “The First Hundred
Years Were the Hardest”, 42 U. Mia. L. Rev. 475, 486–87 (1988).
148. See Fairman, supra note 126, at 247–48; Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st
Sess. 207–08 (1869).
149. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 192, 207-08 (1869).
150. Id. at 208.
151. Id. at 207–19.
152. Id. at 209–10.
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nine-member Court, which gave Grant an opportunity to add a ninth
justice to the Court to replace Wayne.153
A full decade post-Civil War with a significant majority gave
Republicans free reign to further experiment with the Court’s size, but
they maintained the nine-member Court. Although it was restored to
its former size, a lasting outcome of the era was a delinking of the size
of the Court from the number of circuits. Even though the number of
circuits has grown over the years, and although Congress repeatedly
linked the size of the Court to the number of circuits during the first
eighty years after the ratification of the Constitution, the Court has
had nine members for the last century-and-a-half.

V. The New Deal Era
In 1932, Franklin Roosevelt’s landslide election promised sweeping
economic changes to address widespread poverty that had gripped the
nation in the Great Depression.154 In his first 100 days in office,
Roosevelt led a Democratic Congress to pass a series of bills to regulate
and stimulate the economy.155 The reaction of the Supreme Court to
this avalanche of legislation was highly anticipated.156
In early 1935, the Court struck down a provision of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) as an unconstitutional delegation of
power to the president to regulate oil production.157 Next, the Court
declared the Railroad Retirement Act unconstitutional.158 Soon
153. Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44, 44 (“An Act to amend the
Judicial System of the United States.”); see Supreme Court Nominations
(1789-Present), supra note 40 (showing that Grant nominated his first
Supreme Court justice in late 1869).
154. See Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy:
A Study of a Crisis in American Power Politics 76 (Octagon Books
1979).
155. See Id. at 77.
156. See William E. Leuchtenburg, When Franklin Roosevelt Clashed with
the Supreme Court—and Lost, Smithsonian Mag. (May 2005),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/when-franklin-roosevelt-clashedwith-the-supreme-court-and-lost-78497994/ [https://perma.cc/X8GT-GJJ4].
Robert Jackson, who was well-acquainted with the Roosevelt
administration, writes that “speculation turned” about how the Court’s
swing justices would decide any cases concerning New Deal plans, but also
wrote that “[m]ost people, in and out of the Administration, were
confident that all was well” with the “New Deal experiments.” See
Jackson, supra note 154, at at 83–85; see Solicitor General: Robert H.
Jackson, U.S. Dep’t of Just., https://www.justice.gov/osg/bio/roberth-jackson [https://perma.cc/JZC2-BHY7] (Oct. 31, 2014) (detailing
Jackson’s political partnership with Roosevelt).
157. Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (popularly known
as the “hot oil” case).
158. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362 (1935).
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thereafter, Roosevelt began privately discussing increasing the size of
the Court to protect New Deal legislation.159
Then, on a single day, May 27, 1935, the Supreme Court
unanimously struck down the NIRA160 and the Frazier–Lemke Farm
Bankruptcy Act,161 and limited the president’s power to remove
members of independent agencies.162 These results caused FDR to speak
out publicly against the Court.163 In December, Roosevelt privately
considered different strategies to work around the Court, including a
constitutional amendment to limit the power of the Court to review the
constitutionality of legislation.164
Opposition to executive power and economic regulation was
anchored by a group of four conservative justices disparagingly referred

159. See The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The First Thousand
Days, 1933–1936, at 495 (Simon & Schuster 1953) (“Clearly, it is
running in the President’s mind that substantially all of the New Deal
bills will be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. This will
mean that everything that this Administration has done of any moment
will be nullified.”). Ickes was Roosevelt’s Secretary of the Interior and was
an important political figure throughout the New Deal era. Harold L.
Ickes Dead at 77; Colorful Figure in New Deal: Self-Styled ‘Curmudgeon’
Was Secretary of Interior in Long, Stormy Career, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4,
1952, at 1.
160. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42
(1935).
161. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601–02 (1935).
162. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–30 (1935).
163. See Franklin Roosevelt, President of the U.S., Press Conference #209, at
7–28 (May 31, 1935), in Press Conferences of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, 1933-1945, at 309, 315–36 (“I think it is perfectly proper to
say further that the implications of this decision could, if carried to their
logical conclusion, strip the Federal Government of a great many other
powers.”) (transcript available at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/
collections/franklin/?p=collections/findingaid&id=508 [https://perma.cc/
236H-CCFU]).
164. See The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: The First Thousand
Days, supra note 159, at 495 (noting the President proposed “an
amendment to the Constitution conferring explicit power on the Supreme
Court to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, a power which is not
given anywhere in the Constitution as it stands. The amendment would
also give the Supreme Court original jurisdiction on constitutional
questions affecting statutes. If the Supreme Court should declare an act
of Congress to be unconstitutional, then—a congressional election having
intervened—if Congress should repass the law so declared to be
unconstitutional, the taint of unconstitutionality would be removed and
the law would be a valid one.”).
The criticism of the Supreme Court extended beyond the White House.
See, e.g., Sidney Ratner, Was the Supreme Court Packed by President
Grant?, 50 Pol. Sci. Q. 343, 357–58 (1935).
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to by New Dealers as “the four horsemen of reaction.”165 The four were
often joined by two “swing” justices, and sometimes even by members
of the court’s liberal faction.166 The Court held that much of the New
Deal legislation exceeded the power of Congress, applying restrictive
interpretations of the Commerce Clause. For example, in 1936, the
Court voided the Agricultural Adjustment Act,167 the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act,168 and the Municipal Bankruptcy Act.169 Following
these decisions, Roosevelt’s Attorney General, Robert Jackson,
complained that “hell broke loose,” since lower courts, following the
lead of the Supreme Court, issued over 1,600 injunctions nullifying
federal laws.170
During his first term, Roosevelt had no opportunity to appoint a
justice to the Court.171 But after FDR enjoyed another landslide victory
in the 1936 elections, he put a court reform plan into motion.172 The
165. See Richard A. Maidment, The Judicial Response to the New
Deal: The US Supreme Court and Economic Regulation, 1934–
1936 13–15, 129 (1992); Michael Nelson, The President and the Court:
Reinterpreting the Court-Packing Episode of 1937, 103 Pol. Sci. Q. 267,
268 (1988). For more information on the “four horsemen,” see Drew
Pearson & Robert S. Allen, The Nine Old Men 116, 186, 198, 222
(1936).
166. The Court’s four conservative members were Justices Willis Van
Devanter, George Sutherland, James McReynolds, and Pierce Butler. The
two “swing” members were Justice Owen Roberts and Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes. The three liberal members were Justices Louis
Brandeis, Harlan Fiske Stone, and Benjamin Cardozo. See Jackson,
supra note 154, at 82–85; U.S. Supreme Court, Photograph, 1937, U.S.
Capitol Visitor Ctr., https://www.visitthecapitol.gov/exhibitions/
artifact/us-supreme-court-photograph-1937 [https://perma.cc/S397-7X5H]
(last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
167. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936).
168. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1936).
169. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 532
(1936).
170. See Jackson, supra note 154, at 115.
171. See id. at 187.
172. The plan FDR pursued was close to one originally proposed in 1913 by
one of the “Horsemen,” James McReynolds, when he was President
Wilson’s Attorney General. Compare 1913 Att’y Gen. Ann. Rep. 5,
with President Roosevelt’s February 5, 1937 Message to Congress on the
Reorganization of the Judicial Branch of the Government, The Am.
Presidency Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
message-congress-the-reorganization-the-judicial-branch-the-government
[https://perma.cc/4733-B3NF] (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
The Supreme Court problem that FDR confronted was due largely to the
fact that in 1932, in a Depression-induced austerity measure, Congress
cut the Supreme Court justices’ retirement salary in half. See Judge
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president’s plan would have allowed Justices to retire with a full pension
at the age of seventy.173 For each justice on the court over that age who
had been on the bench for over ten years, the president would appoint
an additional justice, up to a total of fifteen.174
The plan engendered widespread opposition, even from Democratic
leaders in Congress.175 After the chair of the House Judiciary Committee
refused to pass the bill through his committee,176 Roosevelt took to the
radio to appeal to the American people in one of his fireside chats.177
He argued that his proposal would allow for the speedier administration
of justice and introduce the perspective of younger men, with more
experience in the modern world, to affect the Court’s decision-making.178
Warner Gardner, the young research assistant who drafted the plan to
oppose “judicial tyranny,” speculated that this disingenuous messaging
contributed to its failure.179
Opposition from the Court itself helped to defeat Roosevelt’s plan.
On March 21, 1937, Chief Justice Hughes wrote a letter to Congress

Glock, The Lost History of FDR’s Court-Packing Scandal, Politico (Feb.
24, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/02/24/the-losthistory-of-fdrs-court-packing-scandal-225201/ [https://perma.cc/LS2RS9ZV]. The upshot was that no justice retired for the next five years, the
longest period without a Court retirement since the creation of the ninejustice Court in the 1860s. See id. Congress rescinded the retirement cuts
in 1937. See id.; Retirement Act of 1937, ch. 21, 50 Stat. 24; see also
Matthew Madden, Note, Anticipated Judicial Vacancies and the Power
to Nominate, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1156–57 (2007) (noting that the Retirement
Act of 1937 allowed justices to remain federal judges in retirement). After
that, Willis Van Devanter promptly resigned, giving FDR his longdelayed appointment, which FDR filled with then Senator Hugo Black
(D-Ala.); Supreme Court Nominations (1789-Present), supra note 40. By
1941, Roosevelt had made eight appointments, and the era of the New
Deal Court was underway. See id.
173. Retirement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 24 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
375 (1940)).
174. Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937, S. 1392, 75th Cong. § 1 (1937);
Hearings on the Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 1–3 (1937) (reproducing the text of
the Judicial Procedures Reform Bill of 1937).
175. See Marian C. McKenna, Franklin Roosevelt and the Great
Constitutional War: The Court-Packing Crisis of 1937, at 288
(2002).
176. See id. at 314.
177. President Roosevelt’s March 9, 1937 Fireside Chat, The Am. Presidency
Project, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fireside-chat-17
[https://perma.cc/J4UD-MLDY] (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
178. Id.
179. See Warner W. Gardner, Court Packing: The Drafting Recalled, 1990 J.
Sup. Ct. Hist. 99, 100, 102.
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denouncing the plan.180 His letter was more persuasive because it had
the support of both the Court’s senior liberal member, Justice Louis
Brandeis, and the leader of the conservative block, Justice Willis Van
Devanter.181 The letter explained that the Court was able to hear all of
the cases in its docket and declared that the addition of more justices
would not make the Court more efficient.182
A week after the Chief Justice’s letter, in a decision announced
March 29, 1937, the Court upheld a Washington State minimum-wage
law,183 overturning recent precedent.184 Justice Roberts had changed his
perspective, and began to be more deferential to the president and
Congress.185 Then, in May 1937, Justice Willis Van Devanter retired,
giving Roosevelt his first appointment and reducing the urgency of
efforts to reform the Court.186 Roosevelt’s bill also ran into political
trouble because of the sudden death of its chief congressional sponsor,
Senate Majority Leader Joe Robinson (D-Arkansas), on July 14.187
Robinson’s dogged efforts to secure Democratic votes for the proposal
seemed to have contributed to his death.188 The Senate voted against
Roosevelt’s court reform bill just over a week later, on July 22, 1937.189
Unlike the successful efforts to change the Court’s size in the 19th
century, Roosevelt’s plan to expand the size of the Supreme Court
failed. His attempt to do so proved to be a catalyst for a split in the

180. Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 75th Cong. 488–92 (1937) (statement of J. Burton K. Wheeler
reading C.J. Hughes’s letter).
181. See Richard D. Friedman, Chief Justice Hughes’ Letter on Court-Packing,
1997 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 76, 81 (1997).
182. Id.
183. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398–99 (1937).
184. For example, in Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of D.C., 261 U.S. 525, 545,
562 (1923), the Court struck down federal minimum-wage legislation for
women as an unconstitutional infringement of liberty of contract,
protected by the due-process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
185. See G. Edward White, West Coast Hotel's Place in American
Constitutional History, 122 Yale L. J. Online 69, 70–71 (2012),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1101_y2wk69v4.pdf [https://perma.cc/
DXG2-9A6E].
186. See McKenna, supra note 175, at 459.
187. See id. at 504.
188. See id.; see also Joseph T. Robinson: The “Fightingest” Man in the U.S.
Senate, U.S. Senate, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
common/generic/People_Leaders_Robinson.htm [https://perma.cc/2CNDEKXY] (last visited Sept. 13, 2021).
189. See Mckenna, supra note 175, at 518, 521.
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congressional Democratic majority, which undermined the Roosevelt
Administration’s domestic agenda in the years ahead.190

Conclusion
Today, the population of the United States is almost 100 times
what it was when the federal court system was established by the
Judiciary Act of 1789 and almost ten times what it was when Congress
restored the Court to nine justices in 1869.191 More than two hundred
years of exponential population growth has been accompanied by steady
increases in the number of litigants seeking appellate review.192 The
result, a “crisis of volume,” means that those who appeal cases in the
federal system are met with long delays and pressure to settle cases.193
The enormous volume of cases also impedes litigants’ access to the
Supreme Court, where the number of petitions for certiorari has trended
gradually upwards through the 20th and early 21st century.194 The
proportion of petitions for certiorari that are granted by the Supreme
Court has trended downward from 20% in 1926 to just 4% in 2013.195
Congress has the power to change both the number of Supreme
Court Justices and the size of the lower courts, and to limit the Court’s

190. See id. at 554 (explaining that for the remainder of its term, the 75th
Congress “did very little legislating”); James T. Patterson,
Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of
the Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939, at 216, 217,
219–20 (1967).
FDR’s inability to convince Congress to make his Civilian Conservation
Corps a permanent program was among the chief casualties of the loss of
working control over Congress in the 1938 election. See Douglas
Brinkley, Rightful Heritage: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the
Land of America 173, 338, 380, 451, 583 (2016) (explaining the CCC,
its accomplishments, and its demise), reviewed by Michael C. Blumm, The
Nation’s First Forester-in-Chief: The Overlooked Role of FDR and the
Environment, 33 J. Land Use & Env’t L. 25, 50, 55 (2017).
191. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
2012, at 8 tbl.1 (2012).
192. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Rationing Justice on Appeal: The
Problems of the U.S. Courts of Appeals 43–50 (1994) (discussing
that, due to docket growth, federal appellate cases in 1990 took
significantly longer than federal appellate cases in 1950).
193. Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 109 (Nat’l Inst.
of Just. 1990).
194. See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, & Thomas
G. Walker, The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions, &
Developments 72–75 (4th ed. 2007).
195. See id.
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jurisdiction.196 To increase litigants’ access to the Court, Congress could
bolster the Court’s ability to take on cases by adding justices to the
Court and allowing it to hear cases in panels. Also, Congress could
remove cases from the Court’s caseload by limiting the Court’s
jurisdiction so long as the Court retains jurisdiction over the types of
cases specifically granted to it by the Constitution. Simultaneously,
Congress could expand the existing lower courts’ jurisdiction or create
specialized courts to hear certain cases. The Biden Commission explored
these possibilities, among others, in the report it released in December
2021.197
Although the Commission’s report is not charged with issuing
specific recommendations for the future of the Court, this history makes
clear that there are neither constitutional nor historical reasons for
thinking that a nine-member Supreme Court is inevitable.198 Moreover,
196. The Judicial Branch, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
about-the-white-house/our-government/the-judicial-branch/ [https://
perma.cc/XP35-W7PP] (lasted visited Aug. 28, 2021).
197. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
198. For example, of the twelve countries that the World Justice Project’s Rule
of Law Index 2020 ranks higher than the United States in both “Rule of
Law” and “Open Government,” seven have high courts with the power of
constitutional review that have more members than the United States
Supreme Court. These range from twelve members (the Supreme Court
of the United Kingdom); sixteen members (the Supreme Court of Sweden
and the German Federal Constitutional Court); nineteen members (the
Supreme Court of Denmark, the Supreme Court of Estonia, and the
Supreme Court of Norway); twenty members (the Supreme Court of
Finland); and thirty-six members (Supreme Court of the Netherlands.
World Just. Project, Rule of Law Index 2020 (2020), https://
worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020Online_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5DR-V76E]; The Supreme Court, Jud.
Comm. of the Privy Council, https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/thesupreme-court.html#:~:text=In%20October%202009%2C%20The%20
Supreme,from%20both%20Government%20and%20Parliament [https://
perma.cc/SV75-2BCY] (last visited Sept. 13, 2021); Sweden, Network
of the Presidents of the Sup. Jud. Ct. of the Eur. Union,
https://www.network-presidents.eu/page/sweden-0 [https://perma.cc/
3HWE-VTLT] (last visited Sept. 13, 2021); Structure: Justices, F.
Const. Ct., https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/EN/Das-Gericht/
Organisation/organisation_node.html [https://perma.cc/YJS9-C4UJ] (last
visited Sept. 13, 2021) (Germany’s high court); Denmark, Network of
the Presidents of the Supreme Jud. Ct. of the Eur. Union,
https://www.network-presidents.eu/page/danmark [https://perma.cc/92V78KHV] (last visited Sept. 13, 2021); Estonia, Network of the
Presidents of the Supreme Jud. Ct. of the Eur. Union,
https://www.network-presidents.eu/page/estonia [https://perma.cc/VB9XPT26] (last visited Sept. 13, 2021); Supreme Administrative Court of
Finland, European L. Inst., https://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/
membership/institutional-members/supreme-administrative-court-of-finland/
[https://perma.cc/L46F-TZRM] (last visited Sept. 13, 2021); Norway,
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although the historical record indicates that the size of the Court grew
with increased population and the accompanying increase in federal
courts of appeal, all adjustments in the size of the Court were politically
explainable. From the fractious 1801 and 1802 statutes199 to the 1837
statute200 to the Civil War changes,201 all increases and contractions in
the Court’s size benefited the political party in power.
The numerous 19th-century changes in the size of the Court seems
to have been eclipsed in the modern mind by the so-called “court
packing” failure of 1937.202 That effort may have been overambitious or
unwise, but history shows that it was hardly unconstitutional. And
what was considered overambitious or unwise eight decades ago may
no longer be in the wake of the Garland and Barrett nominations of the
21st century. The Court’s size has remained unchanged since 1869. But
this study of the eighty years prior shows Congress repeatedly
enacting—consistent with the clear intent of the Framers to leave the
size of the Court to the political branches—additions and reductions in
the Court’s size. No customary practice nor constitutional impediment
would stand in the way of altering the Court’s size in the future.

Addendum
On December 7, 2021, the bipartisan commission on the future of
the Supreme Court issued its report to President Biden.203 The
commission’s unanimous, nearly 300-page report contained no
recommendations, merely discussing the advantages and disadvantages
of proposals like expanding the size of the Court or imposing term
limits. The panel acknowledged the authority of Congress to enlarge
the Court but claimed that there was “profound disagreement” over
whether expansion would further politicize the Court.204 Although the
Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Jud. Ct. of the Eur.
Union, https://www.network-presidents.eu/page/norway#:~:text=The
%20number%20of%20justices%20and,are%20heard%20by%20five%20just
ices [https://perma.cc/8ACA-5ZA5] (last visited Sept. 13, 2021); Netherlands,
Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Jud. Ct. of the Eur.
Union, https://www.network-presidents.eu/page/netherlands [https://
perma.cc/39MQ-2S2C] (last visited Sept. 13, 2021).
199. See supra notes 42–76 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 77–112 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 113–153 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 120–154 and accompanying text.
203. Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States, White
House (Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/pcscotus/ [https://
perma.cc/XV83-PTW6].
204. See Pamela King, Biden Commission Balks at Supreme Court Expansion,
E & E News: Greenwire (Dec. 8, 2021), https://www.eenews.net/articles/
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commission expressed some support for term limits, noting
“considerable bipartisan support,” two prominent members of the
commission, retired Judge Nancy Gertner and Professor Emeritus
Laurence Tribe, favored expanding the size of the Court over imposing
term limits because term limits “cannot be implemented in time to
change the court’s self-reinforcing trajectory, which includes the Court’s
“anti-democratic, anti-egalitarian direction of . . . decisions about
matters such as voting rights, gerrymandering, and the corrupting
effects of dark money.”205 But the commission’s lack of recommendations, in the context of a largely deadlocked Congress, seems likely to
preserve the Rule of Nine for the immediate future.

biden-commission-balks-at-supreme-court-expansion/ [https://perma.cc/
VU6K-NHP5] (contrasting the Republican stonewalling of confirmation
hearings on President Obama’s nominee, Judge Merrick Garland, on
grounds that seating of a new justice should not occur in the election year
of 2016, with the quick confirmation of Judge Amy Coney Barrett just
two months after the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg in the election
year of 2020).
205. Nancy Gertner & Laurence H. Tribe, Opinion: The Supreme Court Isn’t
Well. The Only Hope for a Cure is More Justices, Wash. Post (Dec. 9,
2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/12/09/expandsupreme-court-laurence-tribe-nancy-gertner/ [https://perma.cc/3MWRJ3U9] (“ . . . measures the court has enabled will fundamentally change the
court and the law for decades. They operate to entrench the power of one
political party: constricting the vote, denying fair access to the ballot to
people of color and other minorities, and allowing legislative district lines
to be drawn that exacerbate demographic differences. As a result, the
usual ebb and flow that once tended to occur with succeeding elections is
stalling. A Supreme Court that has been effectively packed by one party
will remain packed into the indefinite future, with serious consequences
to our democracy. This is a uniquely perilous moment that demands a
unique response.”).
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